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Plaintiffs and appellees, Don Paxston and Barbara Rose, submit the following 
responsive brief in the above-entitled matter. 
JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this Court over the decision appealed from derives from Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) and (4), (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the record before the trial court establish that, as a matter of law, 
defendant/appellant entrusted the piano at issue to Musicians Pro Shop, thereby enabling it to 
pass good title to plaintiff/appellees? 
2. Did the record before the trial court establish that, as a matter of law, 
defendant/appellant took only an unperfected security interest in the piano, of which 
plaintiff/appellees took title free and clear? 
3. Did the record below establish that, as a matter of law, defendant/appellant 
clothed Musicians Pro Shop with apparent authority to sell the piano to plaintiff/appellees? 
The standard of review for all issues is that applicable to summary judgments 
generally: this Court independently reviews the trial court's decision for correctness-see 
Mackintosh v. Hampshire. 832 P.2d 1298 (Utah App. 1992). However, if there is any legal 
basis for sustaining the lower court's ruling, affirmance is appropriate on appeal-see Hill v, 
Seattle First National Bank. 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 1992); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw. 788 P.2d 1057 
(Utah App. 1990). Accordingly, if Judge Rokich was warranted in concluding that any of 
the foregoing bases for summary judgment was established, his ruling should be affirmed. 
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DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The following provisions of law support the lower court's ruling, and mandate the 
affirmance thereof: 
Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods 
of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entrustor to a 
buyer in the ordinary course of business. 
"Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of 
possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to 
the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement 
of the entrusting or the possessors disposition of the goods have been 
such as to be larcenous under the criminal law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70-A-2-403 (2) and (3) (1953, as amended) 
"Buyer in the ordinary course of business" means a person who, in good 
faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the 
ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods, buys 
in the ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of 
that kind but does not include pawn broker. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(9), (1953, as amended) 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in § 78-9-104 on excluded 
transactions, this chapter applies 
(a) To any transaction (regardless of its form) which is 
intended to create a security interest in personal property or 
fixtures including goods, documents, instruments, general 
intangibles, chattel paper or accounts; and also 
(b) To any sale of accounts or chattel paper. 
(2) This chapter applies to security interests created by 
contract including pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, 
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trust deed, factor lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipts, or 
other lien or title retention contract and lease or consignment intended as 
security. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-102 (1953, as amended) 
Except as otherwise provided in Subsection 2, an unperfected 
security interest is subordinate to the rights of: 
* * * 
In the case of consumer goods, a buyer takes free of security 
interest even though perfected if he buys without knowledge of the 
security interest, for value and for his own personal, family or household 
purposes unless prior to the purchase the secured party has filed a 
financing statement covering such goods. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70-A-9-307(2) (1953, as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant/appellant James Miller appeals from an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiff/appellees Don Paxston and Barbara Rose concerning paramount 
ownership rights in a Boesendorfer Model 2003 Grand Piano purchased by plaintiff/appellees 
from Musicians Pro Shop in Salt Lake City, Utah on December 31, 1991. 
Defendant/appellant claimed prior rights in the piano by reason of a 1989 Bill of Sale from 
Keith Gustaveson, the former owner thereof. 
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DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT 
The Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah entered summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiffs/appellees, and against defendant/appellant, on all claims of 
plaintiff/appellees' complaint by order dated March 22, 1993. A copy of the order is 
attached as Attachment 1 hereto. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts before the trial court on plaintiff/appellees' Motion for Summary 
Judgment were drawn from the pleadings, defendant/appellant's own discovery responses, 
and the deposition of plaintiff/appellee Barbara Rose. While defendant/appellee argued at 
length before the lower court (as he has done in his opening brief before this court) 
concerning the interpretation and meaning of those facts, he did not controvert a single 
factual statement on which plaintiff/appellees' motion and the trial court's ruling were based. 
Those facts are as follows: 
1. During December of 1991, plaintiff/appellee Barbara Rose found a 
classified advertisement in a Salt Lake City Newspaper for a Boesendorfer Model 2003 
Grand Piano ("the piano"), for sale at the Musicians Pro Shop in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Deposition of Barbara Rose (R. 225-280) at pp. 6-7. 
2. Musicians Pro Shop was a d/b/a for Go Associates, Inc., a Utah 
corporation which filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code on February 4, 1992. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "1". 
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3. Musicians Pro Shop is a retailer and wholesaler of musical instruments. 
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at 
Exhibit "1"; see also defendant's answers to Plaintiff/appellees' Request for Admission No. 
12 (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at 
Exhibit "2") and Plaintiff/appellees' Interrogatory No. 1 (Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "3"). Copies of defendant/appellant's 
discovery responses are attached hereto as Attachments 2 and 3. 
4. By December of 1991, Musicians Pro Shop had for some time had 
financing agreements with numerous banks and flooring companies, secured by its inventory 
of musical instruments including pianos. See Proof of Claim filed by Kawai America 
Corporation filed in Musicians Pro Shop bankruptcy; Utah Bank and Trust financing 
statement; Keyboard Finance Company, Inc. financing statement (Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibits M4"-M6"). 
5. Plaintiff/appellee Barbara Rose is a trained pianist, who had been 
considering the purchase of a high-quality grand piano for some twenty years. Rose 
Deposition (R. 225-280) at p. 9. 
6. In response to the classified advertisement, Barbara Rose contacted 
Musicians Pro Shop, and made arrangements to examine the piano during late December, 
1991. Rose Deposition (R. 225-280) at pp. 9-10. 
7. Mrs. Rose traveled to Musicians Pro Shop on December 18, 1991, where 
she was shown the piano by a Musicians Pro Shop employee. The piano was situated in an 
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unlocked room adjoining the main sales area, which was full of musical instruments of 
various types and varieties. Rose Deposition (R. 225-280) at pp. 10-18, 50. 
8. Mrs. Rose had already looked at a used Boesendorfer piano offered for sale 
by Daynes Music in Salt Lake City, which was also kept in a room separate from Daynes' 
other inventory. Rose Deposition (R. 225-280) at p. 49. 
9. The salesperson at Musicians Pro Shop invited Mrs. Rose to play the piano 
for as long as she wished. She tried the piano for some 15-20 minutes, and was favorably 
impressed. Rose Deposition (R. 225-280) at pp. 18-19. 
10. Following her first visit to Musicians Pro Shop, Mrs. Rose left a deposit of 
$100.00 to hold the piano, which Musicians Pro Shop accepted. Rose Deposition (R. 225-
280) at p. 24. 
11. Mrs. Rose then contacted Roger Firmage of Summerhays Music, a piano 
specialist, to ask that he examine the piano and give her an opinion concerning (1) its 
condition, and (2) its fair market value. Rose Deposition (R. 225-280) at p. 52-53; Answer 
to Defendant's Interrogatory No. 1 (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "7"). 
12. Mr. Firmage, who had already examined the piano in place at Musicians 
Pro Shop, told Mrs. Rose: 
a. That the piano was in generally good condition, with the exception 
of a crack in the sound board which should pose no significant problem in the future; and 
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b. Were he (Dr. Firmage) to sell such a piano from his shop, he would 
establish the price at $20,000. Rose Deposition (R. 225-280) at p. 53; Answer to 
Defendant's Interrogatory No. 1 (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "7"). A copy of plaintiff/appellees' responses to 
Defendant's First Interrogatories is attached as Attachment 4 hereto. 
13. Based on Dr. Firmage's representations, and on her own examination of the 
piano, Mrs. Rose spoke to plaintiff/appellee Don Paxston (then in Salt Lake), who urged her 
to purchase the piano, and requested that he be permitted to participate in the purchase 
thereof as a Christmas present to her. Rose Deposition (R. 225-280) at pp. 6. 
14. On December 23, 1991, Mrs. Rose again visited Musicians Pro Shop with 
plaintiff/appellee Paxston and a piano technician who examined the piano. She informed its 
proprietor, Mr. Steve Gustaveson, that she wished to purchase the piano. Rose Deposition 
(R. 225-280) at pp. 20-23. 
15. The agreed-upon purchase price of the piano was $19,999.00. Rose 
Deposition (R. 225-280) at pp. 23-24. 
16. Mrs. Rose agreed to leave an additional $900.00 toward the purchase of the 
piano on the day of her second visit; she requested that payment of the balance, together with 
delivery of the piano, be delayed to December 31, 1991, as she was planning to close on a 
home at that time, and would not be certain of available sales proceeds until the closing was 
finished. Rose Deposition (R. 225-280) at pp. 25; Answer to Defendant's Interrogatory No. 
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1 (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit 
"7"), and Attachment 4 hereto. 
17. Mr. Gustaveson agreed to accept $900.00 on December 23, the balance of 
$18,999.00 on December 31, 1991, and deliver the piano to plaintiff/appellees at that time. 
Rose Deposition (R. 225-280) at p. 25. 
18. Because she was selling her home and moving to a new address at the time, 
Mrs. Rose sought a company which could take delivery of the piano and hold it on her 
behalf until she was moved into her new home and could take delivery thereof. Rose 
Deposition (R. 225-280) at pp. 25-26; Answer to Defendant's Interrogatory No. 1 
(Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit 
"7"). 
19. On the recommendation of Daynes Music in Salt Lake (which would not 
assist her due to the holiday rush), Mrs. Rose contacted The Piano Shop, located in North 
Salt Lake, Utah, and requested that its agents and representatives take delivery and 
possession of the piano on the afternoon of December 31, 1991. Rose Deposition (R. 225-
280) at pp. 21; Answer to Defendant's Interrogatory No. 1 (Memorandum of Law in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "7"), and Attachment 4 hereto. 
20. The Piano Shop's representative stated that he could not have a delivery 
team ready to pick up the piano until late afternoon of December 31, 1991. Answer to 
Defendant's Interrogatory No. 1 (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "7") and Attachment 4 hereto. 
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21. Mrs. Rose thereupon contacted Musicians Pro Shop again, and requested 
that she be permitted to pick up and pay for the piano on December 31, 1991 at the end of 
business, to which Musicians Pro Shop agreed. Answer to Defendant's Interrogatory No. 1 
(Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit 
"7"), and Attachment 4 hereto. 
22. Mrs. Rose met Mr. Gustaveson and The Piano Shop representatives at 
Musicians Pro Shop on the afternoon of December 31, 1991 to accept delivery of the piano. 
At that time, she paid the balance of the purchase price, and received a receipt from 
Musicians Pro Shop. Rose deposition (R. 225-280) at pp. 37, 33, and Memorandum of Law 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "8". 
23. The piano was then transported to The Piano Shop, where it was stored 
until delivery to Mrs. Rose's present address, in mid-January. Rose deposition (R. 225-280) 
at pp. 25-26, Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-
115) at Exhibit "9". 
24. At no time prior to their purchase of the piano were plaintiff/appellees 
notified that defendant/appellant claimed any ownership interest in the piano. Response to 
Plaintiffs' Request for Admissions No. 10 (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "2") and Attachment 2 hereto; Answer to 
Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 1 (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "3") and Attachment 4 hereto. 
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25. Commencing in April of this year, plaintiff/appellees have learned the 
following additional information concerning the piano and its seller: 
a. On or about May 17, 1988, defendant/appellant entered into a 
handwritten agreement with Keith Gustaveson (father to Steve Gustaveson of Musicians Pro 
Shop), apparently giving defendant/appellant discretionary right to select and take various 
items of personal property belonging to Keith Gustaveson as security for discretionary 
participation in mortgage payments on real property belonging to Keith Gustaveson-
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit 
"10"; Affidavit of Keith Gustaveson (R. 120-122) at paragraph 1; Affidavit of James Miller 
(R. 141-145) at paragraph 1. Copies of the Gustaveson and Miller affidavits are attached 
hereto as Attachments 5 and 6, respectively. 
b. Pursuant to this Agreement, Keith Gustaveson delivered to 
defendant/appellant a bill of sale, in January of 1989, purporting to convey the piano to 
defendant/appellant (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
36-115) at Exhibit "11"). 
c. The purchase price listed on the Bill of Sale was $16,000, which in 
fact represented a prior mortgage advance to Keith Gustaveson pursuant to the May 17, 1988 
Agreement (Exhibit "10"). Answer to Plaintiffs' Request for Admission No. 3 
(Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit 
"2", and Attachment 2 hereto). 
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d. Defendant/appellant Miller never took possession of the piano. 
Answer to Plaintiffs' Request for Admission No. 4 (Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "2") and Attachment 2 hereto. 
e. In the fall of 1991, defendant/appellant was notified that the piano 
had been transferred to Musicians Pro Shop for use in giving piano lessons. Answer to 
Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 1 (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "3") and Attachment 3 hereto. 
f. Upon being so notified, defendant/appellant did not take possession 
of the piano-nor did he request that it be removed from Musicians Pro Shop's premises. 
Answer to Plaintiffs' Request for Admission No. 3 (Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "2" and Attachment 2 hereto); Answer 
to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 1 (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "3" and Attachment 3 hereto). 
g. At some time prior to December 15, 1991, defendant/appellant 
learned that Musicians Pro Shop intended to sell the piano. Answer to Plaintiffs' 
Interrogatory Nos. 4 & 7 (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "3" and Attachment 3 hereto); certified letter from Keith 
Gustaveson to Steve Gustaveson dated December 18, 1991 (Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "12") and Miller Affidavit 
(R. 141-145 and Attachment 6 hereto) at Exhibit "1"). 
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h. Upon learning of Musicians Pro Shop's intention, 
defendant/appellant attempted to communicate verbally with Steve Gustaveson, but never 
spoke to him directly. Answer to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 4 (Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "3", and Attachment 3 
hereto); Miller Affidavit (R. 141-145, and Attachment 6 hereto) at paragraph 3. 
i. On December 18, 1991, Keith Gustaveson notified Steve Gustaveson 
in writing that he should not sell the piano (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "12"; Miller Affidavit (R, 141-145 and 
Attachment 6 hereto) at paragraph 3); nevertheless, and notwithstanding his knowledge of 
Musicians Pro Shop's intent, defendant/appellant did not retrieve the piano, but left it at 
Musicians Pro Shop. Answer to Plaintiffs' Request for Admission No. 4 (Memorandum of 
Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "2" and 
Attachment 2 hereto). 
26. Defendant/appellant claims to have placed written notice of his ownership 
interests on or about the piano (see typewritten note attached to Bill of Sale (Memorandum of 
Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "10"; Miller 
Affidavit (R. 141-145 ant Attachment 6 hereto) at Exhibit "1"). Plaintiff/appellees never 
received a copy of the note, however, nor did Mr. Firmage or plaintiff/appellees' technician 
discover it upon examining the piano. Rose deposition (R. 225-280) at pp. 42-43; Answer to 
Defendant's Interrogatory No. 1 (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 36-115) at Exhibit "7" and Attachment 4 hereto). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. If defendant/appellant is considered the owner of the piano at all (see 2, 
below), he plainly entrusted it to a merchant whom he knew dealt in goods of that kind, and 
continued that entrustment even though he had been given actual notice that Musicians Pro 
Shop intended to place the piano in its inventory and offer it for sale to the public. As such, 
Musicians Pro Shop was empowered by Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-403(2) (1953, as amended) 
to pass good title to the piano to plaintiff/appellees as buyers in the ordinary course of 
business. By failing to reclaim the piano even though he knew it was to be sold, 
defendant/appellant made possible the double sale injuring two innocent parties, and is 
therefore the one who must bear the resulting loss. 
2. The nature of the transaction between defendant/appellant and Keith 
Gustaveson was such as to create, on its face, nothing more than a security interest in the 
piano, not an ownership interest as defendant/appellant maintains. The terms of the 
agreement between defendant/appellant and Gustaveson, whatever words of "conveyance" 
may have been used, manifest an objective intent to permit defendant/appellant to select 
items of the Gustavesons' personal property to secure loan advances used to pay mortgage 
expenses by the Gustavesons's. Since that security interest was unperfected at the time of 
plaintiff/appellees' purchase, they take free thereof under 70A-9-307(2) as buyers of 
consumer goods for value and without notice of any prior interest therein. 
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3. By his actions in placing the piano with Musicians Pro Shop and leaving it 
there in spite of notice that it would be sold, defendant/appellant clothed Musicians Pro Shop 
with apparent or ostensible authority to sell the piano on his behalf, and constituted it his 
implied agent for that purpose. The piano was therefore sold to plaintiff/appellees on 
defendant/appellant's behalf. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT ENTRUSTED THE PIANO 
TO MUSICIANS PRO SHOP, WHICH THEREBY 
ACQUIRED THE RIGHT TO PASS GOOD TITLE TO 
PLAINTIFF/ APPELLEES 
Even assuming for argument's sake that the January 11, 1989 bill of sale gave 
defendant/appellant Miller an outright ownership interest in the piano (rather than security 
interest-see Point II, below), his election to leave the piano at the premises of Musicians Pro 
Shop — even with knowledge that Steve Gustaveson intended the sale thereof — constituted 
"entrustment" thereof to Musicians Pro Shop. As a musical instruments dealership, 
Musicians Pro Shop therefore had power to convey any and all right, title and interest which 
Mr. Miller held in the piano to plaintiff/appellees as buyers in the ordinary course of 
business. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70-A-2-403 (2) and (3) (1953, as amended) provides as follows: 
Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in 
goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entrustor 
to a buyer in the ordinary course of business. 
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"Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in 
retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the 
parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the 
procurement of the entrusting or the possessors disposition of the goods 
have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal law. 
The "entrustment" provision of the Uniform Commercial Code was enacted to expand the 
rights of an innocent purchaser of property beyond the common-law principle of caveat 
emptor. It targets precisely the situation presently before the Court herein; where two parties 
each claim to have acquired title to personal property by legitimate means — yet one has 
facilitated the double sale by entrusting property to a merchant. 
As suggested by defendant/appellant's brief, an entrustment contemplates three 
elements: (1) entrustment of goods by delivery or acquiescence in possession; (2) to a 
merchant who deals in goods of that kind; and (3) subsequent purchase by a buyer in the 
ordinary course of business. Judge Rokich properly found that each of these requirements 
was satisfied as a matter of law, based on undisputed evidence1. 
A. Defendant/appellant's acquiescence in Musicians Pro 
Shop's possession of the piano constituted an 
"entrustment" under applicable law. 
That defendant/appellant entrusted the piano to Musicians Pro Shop, for purposes 
of Uniform Commercial Code, is beyond dispute. Defendant/appellant knew in the fall of 
1
 In the case of Sylvester Motor & Tractor Company. Inc. v. Farmers Bank of Pelham. 
153 Ga. App. 614, 266 S.E. 2d 293, 28 UCC Rep. 2d 1327 (Ga. App. 1980), the court held 
that questions of whether or not undisputed facts make out a case of entrustment is a 
determination of law. 
59722.1 15 
1991 that the piano had been transferred to Musicians Pro Shop's business premises, yet 
made no objection or effort to claim it. Defendant/appellant acknowledges that the piano 
was delivered to Musicians Pro Shop with his knowledge and consent (Affidavit of James 
Miller at f 2). He acknowledges that he never took or sought possession of the piano 
(Answer to Plaintiffs' Request to Admit No. 4, Ex. 2 to Plaintiffs' Opening Memorandum). 
He further admits that, even after he had received actual notice of Steve Gustaveson's intent 
to sell the piano to third parties, he made no attempt to take possession thereof. Id. 
Defendant/appellant maintains that his acquiescence in the transfer was procured by 
the assurance that it would be kept in a locked room and used only for piano lessons. As the 
trial court found, this is irrelevant under the statute, which recognizes an entrustment 
"regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or acquiescence". 
Moreover, defendant/appellant concedes that he learned prior to December 15, 1991 that 
Musicians Pro Shop intended to sell the piano, yet failed to communicate any objection 
thereto to Steve Gustaveson. Keith Gustaveson apparently wrote a letter objecting to the 
sale, yet neither Keith Gustaveson nor defendant/appellant Miller made any move to retake 
possession of the piano. At the time plaintiff/appellees purchased the piano on December 31, 
in short, it had been clearly and knowingly entrusted to Musicians Pro Shop with defendant's 
full knowledge that it was being offered for sale. 
Defendant/appellant cites the case of Kahr v. Markland. 543 N.E. 2d 579, 10 UCC 
Rep. 2d 355 (111. 1989) for the proposition that an inadvertent transfer cannot constitute 
entrustment under the Commercial Code, since an entrustment must be "voluntary". From 
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this, defendant/appellant tries to construct a factual question as to whether, when he learned 
of Steve Gustaveson's intent to sell the piano, his response — short of reclaiming the piano, 
which he admittedly did not do — was nonetheless "reasonable".2 
Kahr involved the inadvertent inclusion of sterling silver pieces in a sack of 
second-hand clothing destined for Land of Lincoln Goodwill Industries, Inc. The court 
properly concluded that the silver was not "entrusted" to Goodwill Industries, as the transfer 
was not voluntary but accidental. Hence, the Commercial Code was found inapplicable. 
Instead, the silver was "lost property", possession by the finder of which is valid as against 
all but the true owner under common law. 
The piano here at issue was not "lost property". Defendant/appellant knew that it 
was being transferred to Musicians Pro Shop; he knew thereafter that it was being sold. His 
implication that consent to transfer was obtained under false impressions is expressly covered 
by the statute, which recognizes an entrustment even when procured by "larcenous" means. 
That he agreed to transfer under stated conditions is likewise covered by the statute (see 
above). 
2
 Defendant/appellant seems to believe that actually reclaiming the piano was somehow 
beyond him--"Miller obviously could not just go down and put the piano in the trunk of his 
car and move it" (Defendant/Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 31). There is no explanation 
why reclaiming the piano was so daunting a procedure-plaintiffs had no trouble picking it up 
from Musicians Pro Shop. It was plaintiff/appellant's decision to claim the piano in the first 
place; it was his decision to agree to its relocation from the Gustaveson residence to the shop 
(also accomplished without any difficulty reflected in the record). He should not now be 
heard to plead the size and weight of his purchase (or security-see Point II, below) as an 
excuse for his entrustment thereof to a merchant openly bent on selling it to third parties. 
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Neither Kahr nor any other authority, moreover, gives credence to the argument 
that an entrustment otherwise falling within the Commercial Code standard may be defeated 
by an inquiry into whether the entrustor's post-entrustment effort to prevent the sale of the 
entrusted goods (without reclaiming them) was or was not "reasonable". Once an 
entrustment occurs — however induced and with whatever understanding between the parties 
themselves — the rights of a buyer in the ordinary course of business are and must be 
protected. If the entrustor wishes to undo the entrustment, he needs to reclaim possession of 
the goods so that the very situation here at issue cannot arise. The statute makes clear that 
the rights of the buyer in the ordinary course arise upon occurrence of the entrustment; there 
is no "reasonable man" standard which, if met, gives the entrustor rights superior to those of 
the innocent third party buyer. 
Defendant's continued acquiescence in Musicians Pro Shop retaining the piano 
under the undisputed circumstances of this case make out an entrustment as a matter of law. 
B. The piano was, as a matter of law, entrusted to a merchant 
"who deals in goods of that kind" within the meaning of 
the statute. 
Musicians Pro Shop was a wholesaler and retailer of musical instruments. It had 
granted inventory security interests to numerous manufacturers and wholesalers of pianos and 
other keyboard instruments. 
Defendant/appellant has attempted to argue that Musicians Pro Shop was not (to his 
knowledge) a dealer in "string" pianos, and certainly not in black, six-foot "Boesendorfer" 
pianos. Such fine shades of distinction have never been recognized in the case law, and 
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would serve only to defeat the underlying purpose of the Code's entrustment provisions. 
Certainly, they are questions of law where the nature of the merchant's business is not in 
dispute. 
In the case of English v. Ralph Williams Ford. 9 UCC Rep. 437, 17 Cal. App. 3d 
1038, 95 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1971), a used car dealer was held to be a "merchant who deals in 
goods of that kind" in connection with the acquisition of a new car from another dealer, 
which had then sold to a retail buyer in the ordinary course of business. The court made no 
distinction based on the fact that the dealership customarily dealt in used cars rather than new 
cars, whether the new car in question was the same make or model as those already within 
the merchant's inventory, etc. 
To the same effect is Shacket v. Philko Aviation. Inc.. 33 UCC Rep. 1648, 681 
F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1982), holding that a dealer in used aircraft could pass good title to a new 
airplane to a buyer in the ordinary course of business, specifically holding that the dealer 
trafficked in goods "of that kind" (i.e., aircraft), even though it usually dealt exclusively in 
used aircraft. 
In Matteson v. Harper. 38 UCC Rep. 350, 66 Or. App. 31, 672 P.2d 1219 (1983), 
a bulldozer was entrusted to an auctioneer, who sold to a buyer in the ordinary course of 
business. The court deemed the auctioneer as a merchant dealing in goods of that kind — 
"earth moving equipment". 
See also Couch v. Cockroft. 12 UCC Rep. 280, 490 S.W.2d 713 (1972). 
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The policy behind the cases is clear: if property is entrusted to a merchant whose 
stock in trade is such that an ordinary, prudent person would reasonably expect to purchase 
such goods from that merchant, the merchant should be deemed one who deals in goods "of 
that kind". 
In this case, the trial court properly ruled as a matter of law that there was no 
reason why plaintiff/appellees should have questioned the purchase of a used piano from a 
retail music shop. Plaintiff/appellee Rose herself had seen Daynes Music Company, a 
reputable Salt Lake musical instruments dealer, offer a used Boesendorfer for sale (a line 
which it does not customarily carry). Daynes kept the piano, moreover, in a room separated 
from the main show area of the store. The piano offered by Musicians Pro Shop presented 
no different situation. Neither plaintiff/appellees nor the appraiser and technician which 
they hired to examine the piano had any reservations in this regard. 
Defendant/appellant tries to bring this case within the holding of Gallagher v. 
Unenrolled Motor Vessel River Queen. 475 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1973) by claiming that 
Musicians Pro Shop was in fact two businesses rather than one, and the entrustment was to a 
piano instruction business, not a retail sales business3. His position would be far more 
3
 Defendant/appellant also cites Sylvester Motor & Tractor Company. Inc. v. Farmers 
Bank of Pelham. 153 Ga. App. 614, 266 S.E. 2d 293, 28 UCC Rep. 2d 1327 (Ga. App. 
1980)in this regard. His reliance here is a mystery. Plaintiff/appellant in that action argued 
that a tractor which it had purchased from the possessor thereof was transferred free and 
clear of defendant/appellee's security interest, the court rejected the argument, noting that 
plaintiff/appellant was not a buyer in the ordinary course of business, but a merchant. There 
was no discussion of whether or not the seller of the tractor dealt in goods of that kind or 
(continued...) 
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persuasive in this regard had he not been given full knowledge that Steve Gustaveson, the 
sole operator of Musicians Pro Shop, had taken the piano into its inventory for sale to the 
public. This knowledge notwithstanding, defendant/appellant did nothing to reclaim 
possession of the piano, thereby acquiescing in its entrustment to Musicians Pro Shop — as a 
retailer of musical instruments.4 
Even without this critical distinction, however, the Gallagher decision is not 
controlling here. That case involved the operation of a small boat marina, where small craft 
were routinely moored (as well as being repaired, bought and sold). A buyer in the ordinary 
course of business would not rationally assume that any given vessel docked at the marina 
was part of the inventory being held for sale. The facts in this case (exhaustively set out in 
prior memoranda as well as Barbara Rose's deposition) are very different. By 
defendant/appellant's own submitted testimony, Musicians Pro Shop was a retailer in musical 
instruments; the piano had been placed on the premises with defendant/appellant's consent. 
In December of 1991, however, Steve Gustaveson openly announced his intentions to take 
3(... continued) 
not. (As noted above, though, the court in Sylvester did rule that fundamental entrustment 
questions are questions of law, not fact.) 
4
 If, as Keith Gustaveson maintains, he posted a note inside the piano asserting Miller's 
ownership interest therein (plaintiffs never saw such a note—see Response to Plaintiffs' 
Request for Admissions No. 10, Ex. 2 to Plaintiffs' Opening Memorandum; Answer to 
Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 1 (Ex. 3 to Plaintiffs' Opening Memorandum)), defendant 
plainly contemplated that Musicians Pro Shop would be granting the buying public access to 
the piano. 
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possession of the piano and sell it, in response to which defendant/appellant did nothing to 
reclaim the piano. 
Defendant/appellant's litany of anticipated trial evidence — that a wall separated 
the piano from other areas of the shop, that the room in which it was located had at one time 
had a sign on the door indicating it as a music studio (there is no dispute that the sign was 
gone when plaintiffs/appellees visited the store), etc. — adds nothing to the analysis which 
led the lower court to rule in plaintiff/appellants' favor. Neither should that decision be 
disturbed on appeal. 
C. Plaintiff/appellees purchased the piano as buyers in the 
ordinary course of business. 
The Uniform Commercial Code defines a buyer in the ordinary course of business 
as follows: 
"Buyer in the ordinary course of business" means a person who, in good 
faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the 
ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods, buys 
in the ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of 
that kind but does not include pawn broker. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(9) (1953, as amended). 
The undisputed evidence in this case bring plaintiff/appellees squarely within the 
statutory definition. Barbara Rose answered a classified advertisement for a used piano at an 
area music shop. She examined the piano on two separate occasions, and left a deposit 
towards its purchase. She verified the asking price as fair market value with an independent 
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appraiser (who had himself been to see the piano, and gave her no indication that he saw 
anything improper in its sale). She then arranged for pick up and delivery, together with 
final payment, on a date and at a time necessary to accommodate her own schedule. Upon 
paying the balance of the purchase price, she was given a receipt by Musicians Pro Shop, 
and the piano was transported to a storage facility until it could be moved to her new 
address. It is likewise undisputed that full fair market value was given for the piano. 
Defendant/appellant argues that fact questions persist regarding whether 
plaintiffs/appellees knew of his ownership interest in light of the alleged note left in the 
piano. What evidence places these questions at issue is not explained — it is undisputed that 
plaintiffs/appellees took possession of the piano, and title thereto, with absolutely no 
knowledge of any competing claim of right therein. That defendant/appellant claims to have 
left a note inside the piano is irrelevant in this regard — plaintiffs/appellees were never 
shown, nor did they ever see, such written notification, and no evidence to the contrary 
appears of record. 
There is likewise no triable issue as to whether the nature of Musicians Pro Shop's 
business deprived plaintiffs/appellees of their status as buyers in the ordinary course. The 
evidence here is undisputed — Musicians Pro Shop dealt in musical instruments, and held 
itself out to the public as such. The trial court properly concluded that it was "in the 
business of selling goods of that kind" — see subpoint B, above. 
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In the case of Standard Leasing Corp. v. Missouri Roth Company, Inc.. 41 UCC 
Rep. 1280, 693 S.W.2d 232 (Ct. App. Mo. W.D. 1985), Missouri Court of Appeals 
explained the underlying purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code's entrustment provisions 
relied on here: 
Section 2-403(2) places a greater burden on bailors than previous 
Uniform Commercial statutory enactments to exercise discretion in 
entrusting their goods to bailees. . . . In our case, both plaintiffs and 
defendants are innocent victims of fraudulent schemers. But under 
U.C.C. § 2-403(2) [plaintiff] took the risk that its bailee might set up a 
sham corporation to aid in its unlawful transfer of [plaintiffs] property. 
Where one of two innocent parties must suffer loss occasioned by third 
person, the person who enabled the acts of the wrongdoer must suffer 
the loss. 
41 UCC Rep. 1285-1286 (emphasis added). See also Executive Financial Services. Inc. v. 
Pagel. 42 UCC Rep. 1185, 715 P.2d 381 (1986)5. In his concurring opinion in the case of 
Manger v. Davis. 619 P.2d 687 (Utah 1980), Chief Justice Crockett voiced a similar position 
with respect to the doctrine of entrustment: 
5
 Defendant/appellant cites Commercial Code authorities White and Summers for the 
proposition that the Code's entrustment provisions place the loss on the party which dealt 
most closely with "the bad guy". Defendant/appellant's following suggestion that 
plaintiff/appellees - who answered an ad in the paper and purchased one piano at arms length 
- dealt more closely with "the bad guy" (Musicians Pro Shop and Steve Gustaveson) than did 
defendant/appellant - who was a business partner of the "bad guy's" father for years before, 
who knew of and acquiesced in the placement of the piano on the "bad guy's" business 
premises, who was told weeks before of the "bad guy's" intent to sell the piano yet did 
nothing to reclaim it, but contented himself with certified letters and posted notes in the 
piano (which the "bad guy" was, of course, at liberty to remove) - sets a new standard in 
spin-doctoring. 
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"I acknowledge the soundness of the proposition that, 
generally, where a loss must be borne by one of two 
innocent parties, it should fall upon the one who made the 
loss possible." 
(619 P.2d 694.) 
It was defendant/appellant Miller's inaction in permitting Musicians Pro Shop to 
retain possession of his piano — even in the teeth of open threats to sell the piano to third 
parties — that has caused the parties' losses in this case. As such, it is defendant/appellant 
who must bear the loss. Judge Rokich's minute entry granting summary judgment in this 
action quoted and adopted Justice Crockett's language from the Manger decision as his 
rationale herein; on this basis alone, that decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
POINT II 
DEFEND ANT/APPELLANT HELD ONLY AN 
UNPERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST IN THE 
PIANO, WHICH WAS SUBORDINATE TO 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEES' RIGHTS AS BUYERS 
Defendant/appellant's claim of superior ownership rights in the piano fails with or 
without his entrustment thereof to Musicians Pro Shop because defendant/appellant never has 
been the true owner of the piano at all. The January 11, 1989 bill of sale through which he 
claims ownership was given pursuant to the May 17, 1988 agreement with Keith Gustaveson; 
the parties to these documents plainly intended not an outright sale, but a security interest in 
personal property, against funds advanced for mortgage payments. As defendant/appellant 
never took possession of the collateral, and never filed a financing statement or the 
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documentation to perfect his security interest in the piano under Article 9 of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code, plaintiff/appellees take title to the piano free and clear thereof. 
A. The May 17, 1988 agreement, and the January 11. 1989 
bill of sale, were intended on their face to grant 
defendant/appellant a security interest — not an ownership 
interest — in the piano. 
Article 9 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code (Secured Transactions) applies to 
all transactions by which the parties intend to pledge personal property as security for a 
separate obligation. This holds true regardless of the form of the transaction, and regardless 
of whether the debtor or the secured party holds title during the pendency of the obligation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-102 (1953, as amended) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in § 78-9-104 on excluded 
transactions6, this chapter applies 
(a) To any transaction (regardless of its form) which is 
intended to create a security interest in personal property or 
fixtures including goods, documents, instruments, general 
intangibles, chattel paper or accounts; and also 
(b) To any sale of accounts or chattel paper. 
(2) This chapter applies to security interests created by 
contract including pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, 
trust deed, factor lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipts, or 
other lien or title retention contract and lease or consignment intended as 
security. 
6
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-9-104 (1953, as amended) sets out twelve specific exceptions to 
Article 9's coverage, none of which apply here. 
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Defendant/appellant's brief argues that the court should confine itself to the four 
corners of the May 17, 1988 finance agreement between defendant/appellant and Keith 
Gustaveson (Ex. 11 to Plaintiff/appellees' Opening Memorandum) in determining whether it 
was intended by the parties to create a security interest, rather than an ownership interest, in 
Keith Gustaveson's property. Plaintiff/appellees concur completely. As indicated by the 
authorities relied on by defendant/appellant, if a writing unambiguously manifests the 
objective intent of the parties thereto, its interpretation is a matter of law.7 On its face, the 
agreement manifests an intent to secure mortgage advances by conditional conveyances items 
of personal property belonging to Keith Gustaveson. 
According to the agreement, Keith Gustaveson was the owner of a building located 
at 254 West 400 South in Salt Lake City. Rental income from the building was, at the time 
of the agreement, insufficient to service the mortgage on the property and "other necessary 
expenses", and would remain so until certain vacant space therein could be leased, or the 
building sold. Under the agreement, defendant/appellant Miller agreed to contribute on a 
monthly basis all amounts necessary to make up the shortfall between rental income on the 
building and the attendant expenses (including mortgage payments). In exchange, 
defendant/appellant was promised a 1/2 interest in all profits generated by any sale of the 
7
 Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomauist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). 
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property — in effect, a joint venture.8 The agreement then provides as follows: 
In return, Gustaveson will give title (ownership) to certain 
unencumbered personal property now owned by Gustaveson. (Piano, 
furniture, C.V. T.V. assets, etc.) Because it is unknown how long it 
will be necessary for Miller to make these cash contributions, 
Gustavesons' above personal properties will be conveyed intermittently to 
Miller upon his request and in the order he specifies. . . . Gustaveson 
will have the option to repurchase, at the same price sold, and without 
interest, the personal property that has been conveyed to Miller up to 
that time." (emphasis added) 
In sum, then, defendant/appellant Miller would assist in making mortgage 
payments on the real property, in exchange for being guaranteed a one-half participation in 
all profits realized from the ultimate sale thereof. Partial mortgage payments would be 
advanced interest free, defendant/appellant reserving the right to designate certain of the 
Gustaveson's personal assets for transfer — but with an absolute right of repurchase for an 
amount equal to the exact sum secured thereby. When defendant/appellant Miller received a 
bill of sale for the piano in January of 1989, it was an instance of securing a prior 
$16,000.00 payment as provided in his agreement with Keith Gustaveson. The fact that 
defendant/appellant never even took possession of the piano further establishes that, as a 
8
 Defendant/appellant Miller's participation in one-half the profits from the building sale 
constitutes the May 17, 1988 agreement a joint venture agreement — See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 48-1-3 (1953 as amended). Defendant/appellant's ongoing participation in half the profits 
from the sale of the real property, coupled with his lending of partial mortgage payments on 
a zero-percent repayment basis (as described above), fully make out that his purchase of the 
Gustaveson's personal assets - including the piano - was intended as security for his 
participation in the partnership venture, not as an outright vendor-purchaser transaction. 
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i i 12 ittei c if la w tl le arrangement was structured and intended as a device for securing 
mortgage advances to the Gustavesons, Whether the transaction be characterized as a 
pledge, cl lattel mortgage, conditional sale, trust receipt or otherwise, its substance was the 
offering of the piano as security for the prior advance of $16,000.00, until such time as it 
riiiilil In'! "m jiiNfiivlKisnr iii'iJli through the sale of the building, or by other means), at which 
time Miller was contractually bound to "reconvey", or release his securities interest. 
- ^ , - i L ±±HL i , 7 UCC Rep. 604 (E. D. Pa. 1.970) the 
owne* a musical instruments business executed an agreement in favor of a finance 
i -^ni uic tiue of the finance company in musical 
instruments. Nevertheless, the purpose of the agreement being to generate operating capital 
ft ' the agreement a "trust receipt" in favor of the 
finance company, and ruled that the arrangement was subject to the provisions of Article 9. 
Tht; Maid!" siiiiiihii'iiiK in i'i|i|(ilii'if "'i U ill i nil dtli/ndiint/appellant Miller and Keith Gustaveson. The 
intent behind conveying the Gustaveson"s personal assets - clear from, the face of the 
n " e provision in the contract that 
title and ownership of selected assets was to pass to defendant/appellant is immaterial — see 
I'hulli ( 'nih1 ."i. in ill in "I IA «> Ji)} (19 S1 as fimenilnn. As such, defendant/appellant Miller held 
a security interest, not an ownership interest, in the piano.9 
9
 Defendant/appellant attempts to distinguish Music At t Center on a single basis - that a 
security interest, not an ownership interest, was at issue therein. It is true that the parties to 
that transaction admitted what defendant/appellant and Keith Gustaveson will not: that the 
(continued...,) 
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Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to all transactions "regardless 
of form"10 which the parties intend to create a security interest in personal property. As 
made manifest by the terms of the May 17, 1988 contract (and as confirmed by 
defendant/appellant's affidavits) the contemplated transfers of Keith Gustaveson's personal 
property to defendant/appellant were not to be outright, arms-length sales of goods. They 
were to coincide with mortgage advances made by defendant/appellant to Gustaveson. 
Defendant/appellant agreed in advance that he would not even take possession of his 
"purchases"; it was expressly agreed "that Gustaveson may continue to use the items . . . 
until such time as they are re-purchased". Every re-purchase was to be at precisely the 
"purchase price" (in other words, the amount of mortgage funds advanced with respect to the 
conveyed item). 
Defendant/appellant makes much of the fact that he was at liberty, pending Keith 
Gustaveson's redemption of items pledged under the agreement, to dispose of them if he 
chose. This fact does not alter the character of the transaction — it merely permitted 
defendant/appellant to declare the sum secured by the article in question due and payable, 
and elect to retain the security in full satisfaction thereof — see Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-
9(... continued) 
documents in question created a security interest only, even though they purported to transfer 
title. Defendant/appellant herein attempts to characterize himself as an arm's-length 
purchaser of the piano, yet the structure of the documents make out a secured transaction just 
as surely here as in Music Art Center. 
10
 Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-102 (1953, as amended). 
59722 1 30 
505(2) (1953, as amended). Pending such disposition, however, the agreement expressly 
preserved Gustaveson's rights of redemption granted by Utah, Code Ann. § /UA-1/ *)(J6 (J9:)j, 
as amended). 
What defendant/appellant and Gustaveson sought to accomplish by the May 18, 
1988 agreement is plain from the face thereof. Defendant/appellant was a lender, not a 
buyer. He held only a security interest in the items transferred under the agreement, 
in: it : l i idii lg the piano. 
Defendant/appellant cites the case of Manger v. Davis, 619 l'.^u 687 (Utah A*>0) 
tun ilii'i proposition that he was the true owner of the piano, not merely a secured party 
therein, and therefore : rights superior to plaintiff/appellees'. 
"^Alg^ •, stands for none of these propositions. In Manger a 
gemologist obtained a valuable diamond ring from, an elderly widow by promising to sell it 
f : i 1: lei oi I con: unissioi i (recer 'ing \* ritten ai ithorization from the owner to do so). The 
gemologist then delivered possession of the riny ID two corporate promoters, furnishing them 
u, and authorizing 
them to pledge it as security for loans of money. The resulting loans defaulted, and one of 
-r in time and right to the widow's 
ownership interest. 
"I in 11 in ill Maiigu concluded ill ii line delivery of'the ring by its owner to "the 
gemologist was a "true consignment", giving the gemologist no rights therein Since a 
St- *ir debtor (the gemologist) 
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obtained "rights" in the collateral (which he did not, the ring having been only consigned to 
him as agent for the owner), no security interest could attach11. 
The facts in Manger make any reliance thereon by defendant/appellant herein 
misplaced. There is no question in this case of either Keith Gustaveson or 
defendant/appellant being a "true consignee" of the piano; the agreement of May 17, 1988 
plainly manifests a transfer, by the piano's owner, of some rights therein to 
defendant/appellant Miller. The question before the lower court was whether an ownership 
interest, or only a security interest, was transferred. In either event, plaintiff/appellees have 
superior rights in the piano, either by reason of entrustment (see Point I, above) or as buyers 
of property subject to a prior, unperfected security interest. In either case, Manger has no 
bearing on the outcome, as neither contingency was at issue there. 
B. By his failure to perfect his security interest in the piano, 
defendant/appellant Miller's rights therein are subordinate 
to plaintiff/appellees'. 
It is undisputed that defendant/appellant Miller never took possession of the piano, 
nor did he file a financing statement therein, or take any other steps necessary under Article 
11
 Manger rejected at the outset the argument that the delivery of the ring constituted an 
"entrustment" under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-403(2), as the gemologist/consignee was not a 
"merchant dealing g in goods of that kind". In his concurring opinion, though, Chief Justice 
Crockett noted that "I acknowledge the soundness of the proposition that, generally, where a 
loss must be borne by one of two innocent parties, it should fall upon the one who made the 
loss possible." (619 P.2d 694.) Without delving into the intricacies of the Uniform 
commercial Code relied on by the majority, Justice Crockett concurred in the outcome, since 
(1) the ring was a unique item, not a common item of merchandise; (2) the gemologist was 
only a consignee of the ring; and (3) he was not a merchant. 
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y 10 perfect a security interest therein12. Article 9 is explicit concerning the rights of 
subsequent purchasers under such circumstances: 
Except as otherwise provided in Subsection 2, an unperfected 
security interest is subordinate to the rights of: 
* * + 
In the case of consumer goods, a buyer takes free of security 
interest even though perfected if he buys without knowledge of the 
security interest, for value and for his own personal, family or household 
purposes unless prior to the purchase the secured party has filed a 
financing statement covering such goods. 
l-A-9-307(2) (1953, as amended) 
plaintiff/appellees purchased the piano for full value, without any knowledge, 
11 ill ii in in 1 i 1 1 i ( i n i| i 1 1 in i ii 1 in i i i ii III in | in \ i i n it ( 1 1 i f > f 1 1 1 1 1 ii i III ( ( 1 1 III in ( 1 1 in i 1 1 i ir i III i n 1 1 1 k if i i| i (1, 1 1 1 1 "l "'I in I I I i ( i in mi 1 I in in 1 1 mi i 
therefore, they take free and clear of defendant's security interest in the piano 
At D^T,* •
 t u\s opening brief, defendant/appellant attempts to argue thai i.'.ni ill! 
In II1 I ii. nil: only a security interest in the piano, plaintiff/appellees somehow took title to the 
piano subject thereto TItah Code Ann. § 70A-9-301(l)(c) (1953, as amended) is dismissed 
hrcausii", ;i« .Iclnhl.ml/itppt Iliiiiil IIIOVI iii hiiNvlalf'cs nlaintiff/appellees were "buyers in the 
i2
 Defendant/appellant argues, at p. 22 of his brief, that a fact question exists concerning 
whether he ever took possession of the piano, thereby perfecting his security interest therein. 
No such claim was raised to the lower court, nor is there any evidence of record to support 
it—defendant/appellant's own admissions are exactly to the contrary. 
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ordinary course of business". Defendant/appellant then points out that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-9-307(l) (1953, as amended) permits a buyer in the ordinary course of business to 
take free only of the security interest "created by his seller". 
Plaintiff/appellees are entitled to rely, however, on Utah Code Ann. § 70A-0-
307(2) (1953, as amended), which applies to consumer goods, and has no restriction to 
security interests created by the immediate seller.13 
Defendant/appellant argues that Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-307(2) has no 
application, as the piano was did not qualify as "consumer goods" in the hands of the seller. 
Plaintiff/appellees acknowledge that some jurisdictions have added the requirement — 
nowhere apparent in the text of the Uniform Commercial Code or its Official Comment — 
that 9-307(2) does not apply to sales by merchants. This rule has not been adopted in Utah, 
however. In the case of Johnston v. Simpson. 621 P.2d 688 (Utah 1980), the Supreme 
Court reversed a trial court judgment rescinding a contract of sale of an airplane. The seller 
was a merchant who dealt in new and used aircraft. In reversing the trial court's decision, 
the Supreme Court held that the buyer took free of unperfected, remote security interests 
(i.e., not created by the seller), since the buyer had no notice thereof, citing 9-307(2). Utah 
has thus expressly applied the section on which plaintiff/appellees rely to sales of consumer 
goods by merchants to consumers. 
13
 That the piano constitutes "consumer goods", see Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-109(l) 
(1953, as amended). 
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POINT III 
BY HIS ACQUIESCENCE IN MUSICIANS PKU 
RETAINING POSSESSION OF THE PIANO, 
DEFEND ANT/APPELLANT CLOTHED MUSICIANS 
PRO SHOP AND ITS PRINCIPALS WITH 
OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY TO SEI I IT 
Again assuming for argument sake, a * skiant; appellant had valid ownership 
rights cgarding * 
under *u Uniform Commerce i ( o d e . the undisputed fact^ »*t il.is case estabiisn that . .JLT 
appiit h 
ostensible or apparent authority to >.i_ i. .
 L ux,\ * plaintiff/appellees, a;v. \\\-:,! n -vu u: 
lb) it 1 ::: ti: ansaction.14 
Utah law has long recognized the doctrine of ostensible or apparent authority, In 
the case of Walker Bank & Trust Co. v Junes, u/J. I ill ' il hi ill I'll ' i illlit iipn nun t 'mill 
held that apparent authority exists wherever a person has created the appearance of things 
such that it causes a third party reasonably and pmdi;"!'1' ••• !» > -•, (hat a uxund |MMV *\ iiS 
clothed with authority to act on behalf of the first pei - 1 hr* .^inciple of ostensible 
authority extends to the selling of goods on behalf of anothe . Is 
has so positioned the seller that it appears there is plenary authonu to d i s u s e of the aoods 
on,, the owner's behall ••• see Watson v. i'oini < in 'IIIIIIH ,' r ( | | | i | M i i n i l i i i i i L n u , ll'IIMI il il I"1 "Il 1 Il , .'""Ill 
14
 That a buyer in the position of plaintiffs herein may rely on common law principles of 
agency, estoppel, etc., in addition to their statutory rights, see Simonds-Shields-Theis Green 
Company v. Far-Mar-Co.. Inc.. 37 UCC Rep. 1547, 575 F. Supp. 290 (W.D. Mo. 1983). 
w ? , , ! 35 
P.2d 1302 (1986). Where such apparent authority to dispose of goods exists, a party dealing 
in good faith with the agent is not bound by undisclosed limitations on the agent's power — 
Amtruck Factors, a Division of Truck Sales, Inc. v. International Forest Products. 59 Wash. 
App. 8, 795 P.2d 742, rev. denied 116 Wash. 2d 1003, 803 P.2d 1310 (Wash. App. 1990). 
Defendant/appellant Miller had ample notice of Musicians Pro Shop's intent to 
hold out the piano for sale to the public as part of its inventory. He attempted several 
telephone contacts with Steve Gustaveson (although he did not persist long enough to speak 
with him in person); Keith Gustaveson sent written notice to Musicians Pro Shop, demanding 
that the piano not be sold. Yet defendant/appellant took no steps to restrain the selling of the 
piano, or to remove it from the possession of Musicians Pro Shop. By leaving it in a 
merchant's possession, with full knowledge that it would be offered for sale, 
defendant/appellant sent a clear message to the buying public: Musicians Pro Shop was 
authorized to sell the piano. Plaintiff/appellees were entitled to rely on that implicit 
representation, and purchase the piano from Musicians Pro Shop. The sale therefore 
becomes final and binding on defendant/appellant Miller who may look to his agent for 
payment, but may not deny the efficacy of the sale. 
Defendant/appellant seeks to distinguish this case from Walker Bank & Trust v. 
Jones by pointing out that plaintiff/appellees had no knowledge of defendant/appellant's claim 
to the piano, it having been represented to them that Musicians Pro Shop and its owner had 
the right to sell the piano to them. Plaintiff/appellants acknowledge this — until being 
contacted by law enforcement officials in the spring of 1992, they were completely unaware 
59722 1 36 
of any competing claim to the piano. Defendant/appellant, however, was the person creating 
the situation by which this was possible; had he acted prudently in reclaiming his property 
(assuming it was his property — see Point II, above), no appearance of authority to sell 
could have arisen, in cncu, then, defendant/appellant became an undisclosed principal, and 
should be bound by the acts of his ostensible agent as fully as if he had affirmatively held 
him out as having actual authority. Certainly, defendant/appellant should not be permitted to 
u c of his cla nil 10 (lit: piano as a device to now 
defeat a legitimate, arms-length transaction by an innocent purchaser. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Rokich's minute entry granting summary judgment (Attachment 1) captured 
tl *- - ^ responded to an ad\ • - u 
b * ausical instruments dealer for a used grand pumo, iu alue there i j,id 
t< 
undisclosed agreement Detvu -i iw» *:* tigers 10 tnc purchase and sale transaction, nom 01 
^lin li • .iisnif, ,1 i1 ilii fuin >» fil.if nin ill ,il llir lii'irj ilr.iln '. pLi' r .*( hiMiirss dcspiie its 
openly-announced intention to take the piano into its inventory and sell it to the public. Post • 
filing disuM'i i >i nioirmi'i n srulnl lliiiil ilrlrn uil/appellan ht.. :i 
the piano at all, but an unperfected secured party therein \* netween rn, paiucN u* ,v^ 
appi/ i i l intuit II ' "I mi in II lllliir i,i(i|niilit!iM, imaittiaik lliiiil | i l i i i n l i H ' i i p p i ' l l m IK 1 a i l p i t i t ' n l Ilii 'UHviiin >i n f 
the piano free and clear of defendant/appellant's claims, whatever their true nature may be. 
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Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that the lower court's March 22, 1993 
order of summary judgment be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JT^ day of October, 1993. 
JONES, WALDO, HOL^ROOK & 
MCDONOUGH / 
CdXviv&c: Rampton 
Vincent C. Rampton 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _/J-__ day of October, 1993, I caused to be mailed, 
posl.H'.r |in.'[),ihl ,i line .11 
following: 
William Thomas Thurman 
Gregory J. Adams 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Bldg. 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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MILLER, JAMES R 
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MTNTTTK l\U'VH\ 
CASE NUMBER 920903004 CV 
DATE 02/19/93 
HONORABLE JOHN A ROKICH 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK MTR 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. RAMPTON, CALVIN L. 
D. ATTY. THURMAN, WILLIAM T. 
*MINUTE ENTRY* 
THE COURT'S RULING ON UNDER ADVISEMENT IS TO WIT; 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. PLAIN-
TIFF'S MEMORANDUMS RECITE THE REASONS FOR THE COURTS DECISION. 
A STATEMENT BY JUSTICE CROCKETT, FOUND IN THE FOOTNOTE OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY MEMORANDUM, ALSO REFLECTS THE COURT'S 
VIEWS IN THIS CASE. 
JUSTICE CROCKETT STATED "THAT, GENERALLY", WHERE LOSS MUST 
BE BORNE BY ONE OF TWO INNOCENT PARTIES, IT SHOULD FALL UPON THE 
ONE WHO MADE THE LOSS POSSIBLE. (619 PD2 694). 
CC 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON/VINCENT C. RAMPTON 
WILLIAM T. THURMAN 
Calvin L. Rampton (USB #2682) 
Vincent C. Rampton (USB #2684) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801)521-3200 
rUE? 35ST35ST C3U8T 
Thiro Jodicsai District 
MAR 2 2 1993 
*y-
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
^ l ^ o a ^ 
DON PAXSTON and BARBARA ROSE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES R. MILLER, 
Defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920903004CV 
Judge John A. Rokich 
The motion of plaintiffs Don Paxston and Barbara Rose for summary judgment 
herein, on all claims set out in their complaint and in defendant James R. Miller's 
counterclaim, having been presented to the Court in accordance with Rule 4-501, Utah Rules 
of Judicial Administration; the Court having reviewed the parties' submittals and supporting 
33490.1 
nr,02!9 
documentation; the Court having further heard oral argument from both sides, followed by 
supplemental briefing and affidavits; and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment be and hereby is granted. 
2. That plaintiffs be and hereby are declared the owners of the Bozendorfer Model 
2003 Grand Piano, Serial No. 9414, which is the subject matter of this action. 
3. That defendant/counterclaimant James Miller be and hereby is declared to have 
no right, title and/or interest in and to said piano. 
4. That plaintiffs be and hereby are awarded costs in the amount of $165.15. 
DATED this AZ- day of March, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
JL- A tN , 
A. ROKICH, DISTRICT JUDG. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
William-T. Thurman 
'Caston 
33490.1 2 
000220 
CERTDFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of March, 1993,1 caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed form of Summary 
Judgment, to the following: 
William T. Thurman 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
10 East South Temple, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
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Tab 2 
William T. Thurman (3267) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DON PAXSTON and BARBARA ROSE 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES R. MILLER 
Defendant, 
DEFENDANTS ANSWERS TO 
P L A I N T I F F ' S F I R S T 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
Civil No. 920903004CV 
REQUEST NO. 1: You first purchased the piano more than a year prior to 
December 31, 1991. 
ANSWER: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 2: You purchased the piano from Keith Gustaveson. 
ANSWER: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Your payment for the piano consisted of forgiveness of 
approximately $16,000 in debt owed to you by Keith Gustaveson. 
ANSWER: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 4: You have never taken possession of the piano. 
ANSWER: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 5: Sometime following your purchase of the piano, you were 
notified that the piano was being delivered to Musician's Pro Shop, which would retain 
possession thereof for an indefinite period of time. 
ANSWER: Deny. 
REQUEST NO. 6: You acquiesced in Musician's Pro Shop taking and retaining 
possession of the piano. 
ANSWER: Deny. 
REQUEST NO. 7: Musician's Pro Shop was in possession of the piano on 
December 31, 1991. 
ANSWER: Deny. 
REQUEST NO. 8: You agreed to or acquiesced in Musician's Pro Shop's possession 
of the piano as of December 31, 1991. 
ANSWER: Deny. 
REQUEST NO. 9: At the time you purchased the piano, Keith Gustaveson, Steve 
Gustaveson, and Musician's Pro Shop did not challenge your right to take possession 
thereof. 
ANSWER: Admit. 
2 
REQUEST NO. 10: At no time prior to December 31, 1991 did you 
communicate to plaintiffs, or either of them, that Musician's Pro Shop did not have the right 
[to] transfer title and possession of the piano to plaintiffs. 
ANSWER: Admit; but I did communicate with Musician's Pro Shop and Steve 
Gustaveson regarding their unauthorized transfer of the piano to the plaintiffs. 
REQUEST NO. 11: At no time prior to or following your purchase of the 
piano did you enter into any agreement with Keith Gustaveson, Steve Gustaveson, or 
Musician's Pro Shop which created or perfected a security interest of any kind in the piano. 
ANSWER: Admit; there is no need to perfect a rightful ownership interest. 
REQUEST NO. 12: Musician's Pro Shop sells musical instrument as one of its 
business activities. 
ANSWER: Musician's Pro Shop sells a specific type of musical instrument to a 
specific type of musical client, e.g. rock n' roll 
REQUEST NO. 13: Your agreement to or acquiescence in Musician's Pro 
Shop's retention of possession of the piano following your purchase thereof constituted an 
entrustment thereof to Musician's Pro Shop pursuant to § 70A-2-403, Utah Code Anno. 
(1953, as amended). 
ANSWER: Deny. 
3 
REQUEST NO. 14: Exhibit 1 hereto is a true and correct copy of a bill of sale by 
which plaintiffs purchased the piano from Musician's Pro Shop on or about December 31, 
1992. 
ANSWER: The defendant is without knowledge or information as to the truth or 
falsity of the request. 
REQUEST NO. 15: Exhibit 2 hereto is a true and correct copy of the checks 
delivered by plaintiffs to Musician's Pro Shop in payment for the piano on or about the 
dates reflected thereon. 
ANSWER: The defendant is without knowledge or information as to the truth or 
falsity of the request. 
REQUEST NO. 16: At no time on or prior to December 31, 1991 did plaintiffs, or 
either of them, have knowledge that their purchase of the piano was in violation of the 
ownership rights or security interest of any other person or entity, including you. 
ANSWER: The defendant is without knowledge or information as to the truth or 
falsity of the request. 
REQUEST NO. 17: Plaintiffs are buyers in the ordinary course of business in 
connection with their purchase of the piano on December 31, 1991. 
ANSWER: Deny. 
REQUEST NO. 18: You were not a buyer in the ordinary course of business in 
connection with your purchase of the piano. 
4 
ANSWER: Admit; however, the defendant is a bona fide purchaser. 
REQUEST NO. 19: Sometime prior to December 31, 1991, you were notified that 
Steve Gustaveson and/or Musician's Pro Shop intended to sell the piano. 
ANSWER: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 20: Notwithstanding your knowledge that Steve Gustaveson and/or 
Musician's Pro Shop intended to sell the piano, you did not take any steps to retake 
possession of the piano before December 31, 1991. 
ANSWER: Deny. 
DATED this 7th Day of August, 1992. 
McKAY JBURTON & THURMAN 
lomas lhurman 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
James R. Miller, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says that he is the 
defendant named herein, and has read Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Admission, and verified the information contained herein 
as true and correct to the best of his knowledge. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN \htiJi me this JicAzy of ^ i W l T ^ 9 9 2 . 
My commission expires: 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
NOTAP v PUBLIC 
William Thomnc Thurman \ 
1200 Konnecott 3ui!ding 
Salt LakeC»:y, Utah ^133 
My Commission Expires 
Octobe- 1. «.99!>. 
STATE OF UTAH 
Tab 3 
William T. Thurman (3267) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DON PAXSTON and BARBARA ROSE : 
Plaintiffs, : DEFENDANTS ANSWERS TO 
P L A I N T I F F ' S F I R S T 
vs. : INTERROGATORIES TO 
DEFENDANT 
JAMES R. MILLER 
: Civil No. 920903004CV 
Defendant, 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1; To the extent that any of your answers to 
plaintiffs requests to admit herein is other than an unqualified admission, state the basis of 
your answer. 
ANSWER: 
REQUEST NO. 5: Sometime following your purchase of the piano, you were 
notified that the piano was being delivered to Musician's Pro Shop, which would retain 
possession thereof for an indefinite period of time. 
ANSWER: Deny. At no time was the Defendant notified that the piano would be 
delivered to Musician's Pro Shop or Steve Gustaveson. The Defendant was notified 
sometime in the Fall of 1991, however, that the piano was be being used by Elsie 
Gustaveson to conduct piano lessons at her personal and locked studio located on the 
Musician's Pro Shop premises. 
REQUEST NO. 6: You acquiesced in Musician's Pro Shop taking and retaining 
possession of the piano. 
ANSWER: Deny. Refer to Request No. 5. At no time did Musician's Pro Shop have 
possession of the piano. The piano was at all times locked in Elsie Gustaveson's personal 
studio-Musician's Pro Shop did not even have a key to the studio. It is impossible to 
acquiesce to something that did not occur. 
REQUEST NO. 7: Musician's Pro Shop was in possession of the piano on 
December 31, 1991. 
ANSWER: Deny. Refer to Request No's. 5 and 6. Musician's Pro Shop never had 
possession of the piano. 
REQUEST NO. 8: You agreed to or acquiesced in Musician's Pro Shop's possession 
of the piano as of December 31, 1991. 
ANSWER: Deny. Refer to Request No's. 5, 6, and 7. 
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REQUEST NO. 10: At no time prior to December 31, 1991 did you communicate 
to plaintiffs, or either of them, that Musician's Pro Shop did not have the right [to] transfer 
title and possession of the piano to plaintiffs. 
ANSWER: Admit; but I did communicate with Musician's Pro Shop and Steve 
Gustaveson regarding their unauthorized transfer of the piano to llie plaintiffs. The 
Defendant, or his agents, did attempt to communicate with plaintiffs and other prospective 
purchasers of the piano. The defendant is without knowledge or information as to the 
success of his efforts. 
REQUEST NO. 11: At no time prior to or following your purchase of the piano did 
you enter into any agreement with Keith Gustaveson, Steve Gustaveson, or Musician's Pro 
Shop which created or perfected a security interest of any kind in the piano. 
ANSWER: Admit; there is no need to perfect a rightful ownership interest. 
REQUEST NO. 12: Musician's Pro Shop sells musical instrument as one of its 
business activities. 
ANSWER: Admit. Musician's Pro Shop sells a specific type ot musical instrument 
to a specific type of musical client, e.g. rock n' roll. 
REQUEST NO. 13: Your agreement to or acquiescence in Musician's Pro Shop's 
retention of possession of the piano following your purchase thereof constituted an 
entrustment thereof to Musician's Pro Shop pursuant to § 70A-2-403, Utah Code Anno. 
(1953, as amended). 
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ANSWER: Deny. The facts of this case do not fit within Utah Code Ann. 70A-2-403 
or its interpretive case law. 
REQUEST NO. 14: Exhibit 1 hereto is a true and correct copy of a bill of sale by 
which plaintiffs purchased the piano from Musician's Pro Shop on or about December 31, 
1992. 
ANSWER: The defendant is without knowledge or information as to the truth or 
falsity of the request. 
REQUEST NO. 15: Exhibit 2 hereto is a true and correct copy of the checks 
delivered by plaintiffs to Musician's Pro Shop in payment for the piano on or about the 
dates reflected thereon. 
ANSWER: The defendant is without knowledge or information as to the truth or 
falsity of the request. 
REQUEST NO. 16: At no time on or prior to December 31, 1991 did plaintiffs, or 
either of them, have knowledge that their purchase of the piano was in violation of the 
ownership rights or security interest of any other person or entity, including you. 
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ANSWER: The defendant is without knowledge or information as to the truth or 
falsity of the request. 
REQUEST NO. 17: Plaintiffs are buyers in the ordinary course of business in 
connection with their purchase of the piano on December 31, 1991. 
ANSWER: Deny. The defendant asserts that the plaintiffs do not fall within the 
statutory definition of a buyer in the ordinary course of business. The plaintiffs did not buy 
the piano from a merchant who regularly sold goods of the kind. Furthermore, it is the 
defendant's position that the plaintiffs knew that their purchase of the piano was in violation 
of a preexisting ownership right. 
REQUEST NO, 20: Notwithstanding your knowledge that Steve Gustaveson and/or 
Musician's Pro Shop intended to sell the piano, you did mil take any steps to retake 
possession of the piano before December 31, 1991. 
ANSWER: Deny. The defendant, immediately after learning that Musician's Pro 
Shop or Steve Gustaveson had gained access to Elsie's studio and was planning to sell the 
piano, took numerous steps to retake the piano. The defendant instructed Steve 
Gustaveson/Musiciaas Pro Shop, via a certified letter, that the piano may not be sold. The 
Defendant placed numerous calls to Steve Gustaveson, which were either unreturned or 
terminated before Steve came to the line. Finally, the Defendant communicated to Steve 
Gustaveson and Musician's Pros Shop that he would remove the piano from the "premises" 
as soon as he was contacted. 
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Moreover, the defendant, again through his agent, placed three identical documents 
in and on the piano, which stated that the piano belonged to the defendant and should not 
be sold. Steve Gustaveson received at least one of the documents from Carl Thiel, of the 
Piano Shop. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: To the extent that you object to any of plaintiffs' 
accompanying requests for admission, state the basis of the objection. 
ANSWER: No objections. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Describe with particularity the circumstances under 
which you purchased the piano. Include in your response the following: 
(a) The identify of the seller of the piano; 
(b) The consideration paid for the piano; 
(c) Identify any and all documents referencing or in any way relating to 
your purchase of the piano; 
(d) Identify all locations in which the piano has been kept, and who has 
had custody thereof, between the time of your purchase thereof on December 31, 1991. 
ANSWER: The defendant purchased the piano from Keith Gustaveson. He paid 
$16,000 for the piano on or after May 17, 1988. There are two documents that reference 
this transaction: the "agreement" and the "bill of sale." The agreement is dated May 17, 
1988; it was prepared and executed on the same day. The bill of sale is dated January 11, 
1989; it was prepared and executed the same day. The documents were distributed to Keith 
6 
Gustaveson and the defendant. The documents were written signed by Keith 
Gustaveson and the defendant. The substance of the documents evidence the sale from 
Keith Gustaveson to the defendant. The physical location of the original documents is with 
either Keith Gustaveson or the defendant. The documents have been enclosed in the 
defendant's response to Plaintiffs' First Request for Documents. The piano has been kept 
at Keith and Elsie Gustaveson's home at 3193 Deer Creek Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
in Keith and Elsie Gustaveson's personal and locked studio on the Musician's Pro Shop 
premises. Keith and Elsie Gustaveson have had custody of the piano at all times. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Describe all communications between yourself and 
Steve Gustaveson, Keith Gustaveson and/or Musician's Pro Shop which referenced or in any 
way related to your taking possession or control of the piano following your purchases 
thereof. 
ANSWER: Keith Gustaveson: general negotiations for the piano, preparation of 
documents memorializing purchase of piano. 
Steve Gustaveson: Defendant's several attempts to orally communicate with Steve 
Gustaveson were not successful. The Defendant's agent, Keith Gustaveson, repeatedly told 
Steve Gustaveson of the Defendant's purchase of the piano. Defendant sent Steve 
Gustaveson a certified letter, dated December 18, 1991. The Defendant is unable to 
provide specific dates. 
Musician's Pro Shop: See above. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Describe all communications between yourself and 
Steve Gustaveson, Keith Gustaveson and/or Musician's Pro Shop which referenced or in any 
way related to your taking possession or control of the piano following your purchase 
thereof. 
ANSWER: Contemporaneous with the purchase of the piano the Defendant decided 
to allow Elsie Gustaveson to continue using it at her home. It was established at this same 
time that the Defendant could take possession of the piano, or sell the piano, at anytime. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Describe all communications between yourself and 
Steve Gustaveson, Keith Gustaveson and/or Musician's Pro Shop which referenced or in any 
way related to your delivery of the piano to, or acquiescence in possession thereof, by 
Musician's Pro Shop. 
ANSWER: The Defendant learned from Keith Gustaveson sometime in the Fall of 
1991 that the piano had been taken to Elsie's private and locked studio on the Musician's 
Pro Shop Premises. The Defendant did not know at the time the piano was moved to 
Elsie's studio that such a move was occurring. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Describe any and all communications which referenced 
or in any way related to the sale of the piano by Musician's Pro Shop and/or Steve 
Gustaveson to plaintiffs. 
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ANSWER: Defendant attempted to communicate with Steve Gustaveson and 
Musician's Pro Shop. He had at least one phone conversation with Musician's Pro Shop on 
the phone on or about December 15, 1991. Defendant is aware the Keith Gustaveson had 
had several communications with Steve Gustaveson and Musician's Pro Shop. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: State the basis of Paragraph 7 of your Counterclaim. 
(Neither the Pro Shop nor Steve Gustaveson had apparent, express, or implied authority to 
convey title to the piano.) 
ANSWER: At no time did the Defendant consent to Steve Gustaveson or Musician's 
Pro Shop holding the piano. It follows, then, that the Defendant would have never 
consented to Steve Gustaveson or Musician's Pro Shop "holding said piano for sale.H 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: State the basis of Paragraph 8 of your Counterclaim. 
(In the event that Musician's Pro Shop or Steve Gustaveson attempted to sell piano to 
plaintiffs, neither it nor Steve Gustaveson were acting as merchants as that term is used in 
the Uniform Commercial Code adopted by Utah). 
ANSWER: Neither Musician's Pro Shop nor Steve Gustaveson were acting as a 
merchant when the piano was sold tu the Plaintiff. This position is buttressed by Utah's 
version of the Uniform Commercial Code, and interpretive case law. Based upon 
information and belief, neither Musician's Pro Shop noi Sieve Gustaveson regularly sold, 
or had ever sold, musical instruments of the type in question here. The piano was clearly 
removed from the retail location of Musician's Pro Shop, and it was in a locked, personal 
studio. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 10: State the basis of Paragraph 9 of your Counterclaim, 
(Neither the Pro Shop nor Steve Gustaveson had apparent, express, or implied authority to 
convey title to the piano). 
ANSWER: The basis for Paragraph 9 of the Defendant's counterclaim is comprised 
of the numerous apparent and express communications made to Musician's Pro Shop and 
Steve Gustaveson. In addition, upon information and belief, Steve Gustaveson and 
Musician's Pro Shop were not merchants, never had possession, control, or authority to sell 
the piano. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: State the basis of Paragraph 10 of your Counterclaim. 
(Any claim of the plaintiffs to the piano are subordinate and inferior to those of the 
defendant.) 
ANSWER: The basis for this claim is that the Defendant is the rightful owner of the 
piano. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify any and all exhibits which you intend to offer 
at the trial of this matter. 
ANSWER: The Defendant's defense is not yet fully developed. The Defendant 
recognizes the Plaintiffs right to an honest response, which he will provide as it becomes 
possible. The Defendant has contacted, or will contact for purposes of his defense, Keith 
and Elsie Gustaveson, the Piano Shop, Dave Olsen, and detective Dick Forbes. However, 
at the present time, the exhibits known to be used are: Bill of sale, the agreement, certified 
letter to Musician's Pro Shop and Steve Gustaveson, and the documents secured in and on 
the piano. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Identify any and all witnesses you intend to call to 
testify at trial of this matter. With respect to each witness so identified, state the substance 
of the testimony which said witness will offer, and state the basis for each claim of fact as 
to which the witness will offer testimony. 
ANSWER: Please refer to Interrogatory No. 12. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify any and all expert witnesses which you intend 
to call at the trial of this matter. For each such expert witness so identified, state the 
following: 
(a) The subject matter on which the expert will testify; 
(b) The substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert will testify; 
(c) Summarize the grounds for each such opinion as to which the expert 
will testify. 
ANSWER: Please refer to Interrogatory No. 12. 
DATED this / day of August, 1992. 
M/KAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
William Tt\9mas Tliuf man 
Attorneys for Debtors 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
James R. Miller, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says that he is the 
defendant named herein, and has read Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Admission, and verified the information contained herein 
as true and correct to the best of his knowledge. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN befoje me this /^day of rW , 1992. 
My commission expires: 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
NOTAP.v PlTBLJr 
William Thomac Thurman 
1200 Konnscoti Quildmg 
Salt «.ak°'-»ty. Utah 3 ^ 3 3 
My Commtssion Exp»res 
October 1. ^99r-
STATE OF UTAH 
Tab 4 
Vincent C. Rampton (USB #2684) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DON PAXSTON and BARBARA ROSE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES R. MILLER, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFFS * ANSWERS TO 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST 
INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. 920903004 CV 
Judge John A. Rokich 
Plaintiffs Don Paxston and Barbara Rose, pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, respond as follows to Defendant's James R. Miller's First Set of Interrogatories 
in the above-entitled action: 
12027.1 
GENERAL OBJECTION 
Plaintiffs object to defendant's First Interrogatories in the above-entitled matter as 
being duplicative, burdensome and improper - plaintiff Barbara Rose submitted to deposition 
on Tuesday, July 28, 1992, during which all issues raised in defendant's First Interrogatories 
were addressed and explored fully. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: State the name and current addresses of all persons 
whom Plaintiffs contacted to obtain information, to verify information, or to review any 
information used in formulating answers to this set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
Admissions. 
ANSWER: Barbara Rose 
1870 East Sunny side Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Don Paxston 
2807 Trinity Oaks Court, #204 
Arlington, Texas 76006 
R. W. Forbes 
Investigator 
SL County Attorneys Office 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Walter R. EUett 
SL County Attorneys Office 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Ernest W. Jones 
SL County Attorneys Office 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. Kevin Bird 
Bird & Fugall 
2230 North University Park, #9 A 
Provo, Utah 84604 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: In the event that any responses to Defendant's 
Request for Admissions are anything but an unqualified admission, please set forth the 
detailed reasons for Plaintiffs' answers. 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs object to Interrogatory No. 2 on the grounds that information 
responsive thereto was covered in full during the deposition of Barbara Rose taken on 
Tuesday, July 28, 1992. 
Without waiving said objection, plaintiffs submit the following information as 
supplemental to plaintiff Barbara Rose's deposition testimony: 
REQUEST NO. 3: Plaintiff Don Paxston participated in the 
purchase of the piano, and covered all technician, moving and storage 
costs. 
REQUEST NO. 5: As testified in her deposition, Barbara Rose had 
participated in purchases from Utah merchants, including ZCMI, wherein sales to 
out-of-state customers were not accompanied by the assessment of Utah sales tax. 
REQUEST NO. 6: Barbara Rose had no basis to know whether Musician's 
Pro Shop was a regular dealer in "stringed" or grand pianos. Musician's Pro Shop 
plainly held itself out to the public as a retailer in musical instruments; many 
retailers of musical instruments in the Salt Lake City area, with which Mrs. Rose 
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is familiar (including Summer Hayes Music, Beasley Music, Daines Music, Hart 
Brothers Music, and others) deal in many types of musical instruments including 
pianos. 
REQUEST NO. 7: Barbara Rose was never informed by any person that 
Musician's Pro Shop did not regularly sell string pianos, nor would such a 
statement be true-Musician's Pro Shop was a registered dealer in Kowai Pianos, 
as established by documentation on file with the United States Bankruptcy Court. 
REQUEST NO. 8: Mrs. Rose was told that Musician's Pro Shop's 
proprietor, Steven Gustavson, "grew up with this piano". No other representations 
concerning the piano's history were made. 
REQUEST NO. 9: See information responsive to Request Nos. 6 and 7, 
above. 
REQUEST NO. 11: After her first examination of the piano on 
December 18, 1991, Barbara Rose contacted Roger Firmage, a dealer in pianos at 
Summerhayes Music in Salt Lake City, to ask if he would examine the piano and 
give an opinion concerning its value. Mr. Firmage responded that he had already 
looked at the piano (which, apparently, had already been offered to him for sale as 
well), had observed that there was a crack in the sound board (which, however, 
would not materially affect the integrity or sound of the piano), and that, were it in 
his shop, he would offer it for sale at $20,000. It is noteworthy that Mr. Firmage 
did not report that, in his examination of the piano, he had discovered any letter or 
notation that the piano should not be sold. 
REQUEST NO. 12: As testified in her deposition, Mrs. Rose felt no 
discomfort over the purchase of the piano, which appeared to her to be a 
transaction in the ordinary course of Musician's Pro Shop's business. Her interest 
in speaking to the piano's previous owner was solely for the purpose of inquiring 
into its history. 
REQUEST NO. 13: Barbara Rose knew of nothing unusual about a 
purchase of the piano. Nothing occurred during either her first or second visit to 
Musician's Pro Shop which would distinguish it from shopping for a used grand 
piano from any other music retailer in the Salt Lake City area. Nothing in her 
conversation with Roger Firmage of Summerhayes Music, or with Mr. Champion, 
the technician from The Piano Shop who examined the piano on December 23rd, 
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suggested anything improper or unusual in Musician's Pro Shop offering the piano 
for sale to the public. The circumstances of the piano's pick up and delivery on 
December 31, 1991 were dictated by Mrs. Rose and her needs. At that time, she 
was in the process of selling her home, and had a closing schedule for the 
afternoon of December 31. She did not want to commit the balance to the 
purchase price until the closing was complete, and therefore asked Mr. Gustavson 
for permission to take delivery of the piano on the afternoon of the 31st, to which 
he agreed. Mr. Carl Teal of The Piano Shop informed Mrs. Rose that he would 
not be able to assemble a crew to pick up the piano until late afternoon on the 
31st. Accordingly, Mrs. Rose requested that the piano be made available for pick 
up at that time, to which Musician's Pro Shop also agreed. 
REQUEST NO. 14: Barbara Rose had no notice from any person 
whatsoever that any person or entity other than Musician's Pro Shop had any 
ownership interest in the piano at the time plaintiff purchased it. 
REQUEST NO. 15: SS£ Response to Request No. 14, above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: In the event that the Defendant's (sic) deny Request 
No. 6, please indicate each item, from whom it was purchased, and the date of such 
purchase. 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs object to Interrogatory No. 3 in that it is unintelligible. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Please explain the legal basis for Barbara Rose's 
contention that non-Utah residents may avoid paying sales tax for goods purchased in Utah, 
even though such goods are not sent directly from the merchant to an out-of-state location. 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs object to Interrogatory No. 4 as asking for a legal 
conclusion; further, as mischaracterizing Barbara Rose's deposition testimony herein. As 
explained in her deposition, Barbara Rose was informed by Steve Gustavson, proprietor of 
Musicians Pro Shop, that he routinely consummated out-of-state sales without the payment of 
12027.1 5 
Utah sales tax, and that he (Musicians Pro Shop) regularly and routinely sold inventory on 
that basis. It was at Mr. Gustavson's suggestion that the piano be sold to Mr. Paxston; it 
was Mr. Gustavson, as the merchant, who, — if in fact he did so - did not deduct sales tax 
from the purchase price paid by plaintiffs at the time the piano was sold and delivered. 
Mrs. Rose had no information, from Mr. Gustavson or anywhere else, that any impropriety 
existed with respect to the sale. Any misgivings which she had or might have had 
concerning the sales tax question on the piano were laid to rest by Mr. Gustavson's 
assurances that the procedure being followed was a matter within the ordinary course of his 
business dealings. 
INTERROGATORY NO. S: Please describe in detail all communications between 
The Piano Shop or its employees and the Plaintiffs with regard to the papers and or 
documents that The Piano Shop had found in and on the piano. 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs object to Interrogatory No. 5 as revisiting information fully 
explored during Barbara Rose's July 28, 1992 deposition in this matter. No further 
information responsive to Interrogatory No. 5 can be offered. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: If Plaintiff admitted Request No. 1, please state how 
long Barbara Rose has been a resident. 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs object to Interrogatory No. 6 as being irrelevant to the issues 
in this case, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible information. 
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Without waiving said objection, Plaintiffs respond that defendant Barbara Rose has 
been a Utah resident for the better part of her life. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please describe all exhibits the Plaintiffs intend to 
use at trial. 
ANSWER: See all documentation attached to Plaintiffs1 Complaint in this action, 
and to Plaintiffs' First Request for Admissions. 
To the extent additional documentation or exhibits are intended for use at trial, this 
answer will be supplemented. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please identify all witnesses the Plaintiffs will call at 
trial and the general substance of their testimony. 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs have not yet determined which witnesses will be called at 
trial. This answer will be supplemented when that determination is made. 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Barbara Rose, having been first duly swom, have read the foregoing Plaintiffs' 
Answers to Defendant's First Interrogatories and I do hereby verify that the factual 
statements contained therein are true based upon my personal knowledge, information and 
belief, and that I believe the relief requested to be fair and reasonable under the facts of this 
case. 3u:£ 
DATED this / / day of irtfemt, 1992. 
^ 4 ^ ^ CO> f?y 
i> Barbara Rose 
DATED this '/ day of Attgwt, 1992. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROX>K & 
MCDONOUGH 
B_ . 
V'wpttft. Hampton 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ,1^ day of Aygust, 1992,1 caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERS TO 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES, to the following: 
William Thomas Thurman 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
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Tab 5 
WILLIAM T. THURMAN (32 67) 
HARRY CASTON (4 009) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-413 5 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DON PAXSTON and BARBARA ROSE, : AFFIDAVIT OF KEITH 
GUSTAVESON 
Plaintiffs : 
v, : Civil No. 920903004 CV 
JAMES R. MILLER, : Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant being first duly sworn deposes and states that he 
has personal knowledge of the following: 
1) In May of 1988 I was the owner of a building located 
at 254 West 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. At that time, I was 
in need of money as the monthly rental income generated by the 
building was not sufficient to pay the building's monthly mortgage 
and other operating expenses. To assure myself of sufficient funds 
to pay the mortgage obligation and other expenses until I had 
either rented the building's vacant space or sold the building, on 
May 17, 1988 I entered into a contract with defendant James Miller. 
Pursuant to the terms of the contract: 
(i) Each month Miller would pay the shortfall between 
the building's monthly rental income and the monthly mortgage 
payment and other expenses. 
(ii) In consideration of Miller's tendering the monthly 
shortfall, if any, I was to give Miller "title (ownership) to 
certain unencumbered personal property I owned; piano, furniture, 
CVTV assets, etc."; (emphasis added). 
(iii) If I was able to sell the building I would then 
(and only then) have the right to repurchase the property that had 
been sold to Miller provided that Miller had not otherwise disposed 
of the property. 
2) On January 11, 1989 I sold the piano to Miller for the 
consideration of $16,000.00. Pursuant to an agreement between 
myself and Miller, I was allowed to retain possession of the piano 
to allow my wife, Elsie Gustaveson, to give piano lessons. In 
December of 1990, my home was foreclosed. The piano was moved to 
the Musicians Pro Shop again for the sole purpose of allowing Elsie 
Gustaveson to generate income as a music teacher. The piano was 
kept in the private, personal and locked studio used 
solely by Elsie Gustaveson. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
DATED this j£ day of October, 1992 
Justavelon 
1992. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of October, 
/ 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
Npitary P u b l i c 
s s i d i n g a t : 
e l iz \har ry \mi l le r l0 .akg 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
HARRY CASTON 
1102 South 1700 East 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84108 
My Commission Expires 
October 10. 1994 
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WILLIAM T. THURMAN (3267) 
HARRY CASTON (4009) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-413 5 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DON PAXSTON and BARBARA ROSE, : AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES 
MILLER 
Plaintiffs : 
V. : Civil No. 920903004 CV 
JAMES R% MILLER, : Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant being first duly sworn deposes and states that he 
has personal knowledge of the following: 
1) In May of 1988 Keith Gustaveson was the owner of a 
building located at 254 West 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. At 
that time, Gustaveson informed me that he was in need of money as 
the monthly rental income generated by the building was not 
sufficient to pay the building's monthly mortgage and other 
operating expenses. To provide sufficient funds to pay the 
mortgage obligation and other expenses until he had either rented 
the building7s vacant space or sold the building, on May 17, 1988, 
Keith Gustaveson and I entered into a contract. Pursuant to the 
terms of the contract: 
(i) Each month I would pay Keith Gustaveson the 
shortfall between the building's monthly rental income and the 
monthly mortgage payment and other expenses. 
(ii) In consideration of my tendering the monthly 
shortfall, if any, I was to receive "title (ownership) to certain 
unencumbered personal property owned by Gustaveson including piano, 
furniture, CVTV assets, etc."; (emphasis added). 
(iii) If Keith Gustaveson was able to sell the building 
he would then (and only then) have the right to repurchase the 
property that had been sold to me provided that I had not otherwise 
disposed of the property. 
2) On January 11, 1989 Keith Gustaveson sold the piano to me 
for the consideration of $16,000.00. Pursuant to an agreement 
between Keith Gustaveson and myself, Keith Gustaveson was allowed 
to retain possession of the piano to allow his wife, Elsie 
Gustaveson, to give piano lessons. In December of 1990, the 
Gustavesons' home was foreclosed. The piano was moved to the 
Musicians Pro Shop again for the sole purpose of allowing Elsie 
Gustaveson to generate income as a music teacher. The piano was 
kept in the private, personal and locked studio used 
solely by Elsie Gustaveson. 
3) That when I learned that Steve Gustaveson intended to 
sell the piano, I made numerous attempts to tell him not to sell my 
piano. He would not talk to me. At my request, Keith Gustaveson 
sent a letter to Steve Gustaveson, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A". I also had copies of the Bill of Sale with 
a note placed within the piano, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "B". 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
DATED this ^ d a y of October, 1992. 
Subscribed and sworn to bef 
1 9 9 2 , 
R. M i l l e r j 
t h i s day of October, 
My Commission Expires: 
ary Public 
e s i d i n g a t : 
e l i z \ h a r r y \ m i l l e r l 0 . a j m 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
HARRY CASTON 
102 South 1700 East 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84108 
M, Commission Expires 
October 10,1994 
STATE OF UTAH 
EXHIBIT A 
DECEMBER 18.1991 
STEVEN E. CUSTAVESON 
THIS IS TO ADVISE YOU THAT ELSIES* AND MY BOOSENDORFER GRAND PIANO 
WAS SOLD FOR CASH TO J.R.MILLER ON JANUARY 11,1989. SEE ENCLOSED 
COPY OF BILL OF SALE. 
YOUR ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO SELL THIS PIANO. WHICH IS PRESENTLY 
LOCATED IN THE MUSICIANS PRO SHOP BUILDING, 25AO EAST BENGAL BLVD. 
SALT LAIE CITY. UTAH 84121, WAS RELAYED TO J.R.MILLER WHO REQUEST-
ED THAT YOU Br ADVISED THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO SELL OR MOVE HIS PIANO 
WILL RESULT IN A LEGAL SUIT BY HIM AGAINST YOU AND THE MUSICIANS 
PRO SHOP. ALSO. BE ADVISED THAT J.R.MILLER IS THE LEGAL OWNER OF. 
IN ADDITION TO THE PIANO, THE FOLLOWING ITEMS THAT J.R.MILLER PUR-
CHASED FROM IEITH I. CUSTAVESON ON JAN.10,1990 and JAN. 5,1990 
RESPECTIVELY. ALL CVTV INVENTORY INCLUDING. BUT NOT LIMITED TO.ALL 
TOOLS, MOTORS, VARIOUS SUPPLIES, MOLDS, BUSINESS FILES. OFFICE 
EQUIPMENT. LADDERS. HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE AND FURNISHINGS. A PORTION 
OF THESE ITEMS WERE/ARE (AS PER YOUR INVATATION AND PERMISSION) 
AT THE PRO SHOP ALSO. MR.MILLER ALSO SAID THAT IF YOU WOULD LIKE 
TO HAVE HIS PIANO AND OTHER ITEMS REMOVED FROM THE PREMISES. HE 
WILL HAVE IT DONE UPON YOUR WRITTEN NOTICE. 
ALL OF THE BILL OF SALES PERTAINS TO AN AGREEMENT DATED MAY 17, 
1988 BETWEEN KEITH I. GUSTAVESON AND J.R.MILLER WHICH IS ON FILE 
WITH THE BANKRUPTCY COURT. 
HE SAID THAT IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS. OR WOULD LIKE A C0P1 OF 
HIS CHECKS THAT PURCHASED THE PIANO AND OTHER ITEMS. HE CAN BE 
REACHED AT 266-1792 (SLC) 
KEITH I. GUSTAVESON 
£ 
cc to; 
J. R. Miller 
1249 E. 4650 So. 
S. L. C. Utah 84117 
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ECEMBER 20, 1991 
—WARNING— 
)ING THIS B0SEND0RFER 
THE PERSONAL PROPERTY 
> LEGALLY THE PROPERTY 
!ES R. MILLER OF S.L.C. 
HE AND HE ALONE HOLDS 
(SEE ATTACHED BILL OF 
LEAVES THE MUSICIANS 
fOP PREMISES IT WILL 
S STOLEN PROPERTY AND 
TED TO THE THE POLICE 
ECOVERY. 
E MOVERS, YOU HAVE MY 
5SI0N AND HEREBY HIRE 
0 MOVE THIS PIANO OUT 
E MUSICIANS PRO SHOP. 
L PAY ALL MOVING CHAR-
LUS $100.00 BONUS. 
ME AT 266-1792 OR MY 
SENTATIVE AT 942-7999 
NSTRUCTIONS AFTER IT 
YOUR TRUCK. IF UNABLE 
KE CONTACT, TAIE IT TO 
PREMISES TILL I CAN 
GE DELIVER DETAILS. 
M LINE IS THAT THE 
IANS PRO SHOP IS AT-
ING TO ILLEGALLY SELL 
RTY FOR WHICH THEY DO 
AVE A TITLE — I HAVE 
MTLE. 
J.X MILLER 
1249 E. 4650 So. 
Salt Lake City, UT. 
266-1792 
EXHIBIT B 
'THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD. SEEK COMPETENT A0VICE.' 
Hill nf Bab 
JKuefe all ^Rtit by tC^ttt $rtflrat*: 
Thai ^ifcjg/nu ^iK^jr^ku^so^L. 
the SELLER , for and in consideration of the sum of: 
to £<ajff&2*7*k in hand paid by « T. &^s*/r+-t~d *. 
-DOLLARS 
the BUYER • the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, has bargained, sold, assigned 
mnd transferred, and by these presents dol^ bargain, sell, assign and transfer unto said 
BUYER that certain personal property now at 
!SsSm:„jLaj&>& County, State of -JUJTuHM. , 
panicularly described as follows: - ^ A^A.Ar^u»- .^. . -^vg^sc^ A?^A^y>x>A?*& 
1 SO • 2i*l& \1 • -V ^ ° C N Y ^ N rtlO^S 
CO 
IOV" 
^*^v **iov*^  to 
T M ^ ^ 
^ S ' -
*S*CfL . - -~ In Witness Whereof, , ^ e 
//-.??. day of JJURJS^OA^. 
Witness: 
«t^ 
have hereunto let *>**. 
, 19£9._ 
hand; this 
